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Abstract
Economic globalization impacts the environment and sustainable development in a wide variety
of ways and through a multitude of channels. The purpose of this paper is (a) to identify the key
links between globalization and environment; (b) to identify the major issues addressed in
multilateral economic agreements in trade and finance that affect environmental sustainability;
and (c) to review priority policy issues affecting the environment in multilateral economic
agreements and environment, thus identifying incentives implicit in trade and investment policy
measures that affect environmental sustainability.  The author categorizes these issues under the
primary areas of globalization: trade liberalization, investment and finance, and technology
diffusion, the latter including intellectual property rights.
In the case of the trade-environment interface, the paper examines the impact of both elements,
and the causal relationship between them. It also pays special attention to multilateral
environmental agreements and their potential effects on trade.  An integrative section on the
effects of globalization and environmental policy and performance leads to domestic and
international priority policy issues and recommendations.
The author concludes that globalization brings with it potentially large benefits as well as risks.
The challenge is to manage the process of globalization in such a way that it promotes
environmental sustainability and equitable human development.  In short, the more integrated
environmental and trade policies are, the more sustainable economic growth will be and the more
globalization can be harnessed for the benefit of the environment.
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Globalization has been the defining trend in the closing decade of the 20
th century and the
dawn of new millenium heralding a new era of interaction among nations, economies and people.
Globalization is an on-going process of global integration that encompasses (i) economic
integration through trade, investment and capital flows; (ii) political interaction; (iii) information
and information technology and (iv) culture.  While all dimensions of globalization affect the
natural environment and through it human development, for the purposes of tracing the main
lines between globalization and environment we will focus on the economic dimensions of trade,
investment and capital flows.  An unprecedented flow of capital, technology, goods and services
crosses national borders daily.  Nearly 20 billion US dollars in capital flows around the world
each day.
Economic globalization impacts the environment and sustainable development in a
variety of ways and through a multitude of channels.  Globalization contributes to economic
growth and thereby affects the environment in many of the same ways that economic growth
does:  adversely in some stages of development, favorably at others.  Globalization accelerates
structural change, thereby altering the industrial structure of countries and hence resource use
and pollution levels.  Globalization diffuses capital and technology; depending on their environ-
mental characteristics relative to existing capital and technology, the environment may improve
or deteriorate.  Globalization transmits and magnifies market failures and policy distortions that
may spread and exacerbate environmental damage; it may also generate pressures for reform as
policies heretofore thought of as purely domestic attract international interest.  While it improves
the prospects for economic growth worldwide and increases overall global output, globalization
could conceivably reduce economic prospects in individual countries, sectors and industries;
such marginalization of economies and people may result in poverty-induced resource depletion
and environmental degradation.
Globalization diffuses world product standards and, to the extent that environmental
standards are higher in the dominant consumer markets, it may create a trend toward rising
standards globally; on the other hand, concerns over the possible loss of competitiveness due to
"unfair practices" or lax standards may lead to a "race to the bottom."  Economic globalization
changes the government-market interface; it constraints governments and enhances the role of
the market in economic, social and environmental outcomes; on the other hand, it creates new
imperatives for states to co-operate both in managing the global commons and in coordinating
domestic environmental policies.
The purpose of this paper is to (a) identify the key links between globalization and
environment; (b) identify major issues included in multilateral economic agreements in trade,
finance, investments and intellectual property rights that affect environmental sustainability; and
(c) review priority policy issues affecting multilateral economic agreements and environment, to
analyze incentives implicit in trade and investment policy measures that affect environmental
sustainability.2
Since this a vast area to cover, we have divided it into the main dimensions of economic
globalization:  trade liberalization, investment and finance and technology diffusion and
intellectual property rights.  In the case of the trade-environment interface, we consider both the
impact of trade on the environment and of the environment on trade.  An integrative section on
the effects of globalization on the environmental policy and performance leads to domestic and
international priority policy issues and recommendations.
Trade and Environment
Trade liberalization and its outcome, freer trade, are both drivers and manifestations of
globalization.  They are also major channels through which globalization impacts the natural
environment and affects environmental quality.  World trade has grown faster than world output
indicating a growing trade-intensity of the global economy.  While global output grew at an
average annual rate of 4% during 1950-94, the world merchandise trade grew at an average
annual rate of over 6% during the same period.  As a result, over the 45 year period, world
merchandise trade grew by 14 times compared to only 5.5 times for the world merchandise
output.  The trade intensity of the global economy increased further during 1990-1995 (WTO
1995).
Trade theory has demonstrated that free trade maximizes the efficiency of resource
allocation by channeling economic activities to least-cost producers; it thus produces a given level
of output at the least cost.  If natural and environmental resources are efficiently priced (i.e. all
relevant social costs are accounted for), the global output resulting from free trade is also produced
at the least environmental cost. Free trade maximizes social welfare.  For example, countries with
high levels of agricultural protection use more than ten times as much chemical fertilizers and
pesticides per hectare as countries with low level protection (see Figure 1).  In this case, trade
liberalization would reduce the use of agrochemicals and hence environmental degradation in
protectionist countries significantly and increase it marginally in low protection countries resulting
in overall gains in environmental protection and sustainability.  If, however, there are market
failures (such as unpriced or underpriced resources or unaccounted for externalities), or policy
failures (such as environmentally-harmful subsidies) that are not removed, resources are
misallocated to start with and removal of barriers to trade may exacerbate this misallocation.
Under such conditions, freer trade would not maximize social welfare.  There would still be
efficiency gains (positive effects) but there would also be welfare losses as wasteful resource
depletion and environmental degradation are exacerbated (negative effects).  The net effect on
social welfare would depend on the relative magnitude of the positive and negative effects.
There are few studies attempting to estimate and compare the efficiency gains from trade
liberalization with the costs of increased environmental degradation or needed additional
environmental protection measures.  Repetto (1993) attempted such a comparison and concluded
that there is no a priori case for giving trade policy a priority over environmental policy.
Efficiency gains from trade liberalization were estimated to range from 1 - 2 percent of GDP to 3
- 4 percent for economies with severe economic distortions.  Environmental control costs and
residual environmental damage costs, on the other hand, range from 1 - 2  percent of GDP to 3 -
5 percent of GDP in countries with lax environmental policies.3
Figure 1:  Relationship between agricultural producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) for 1979-
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Source:  Anderson (1992b, Figure 1) and World Resources Institute (1990, Table 18.2),
             in Anderon and Strutt (1994).4
Box 1.  Trade-related Environmental Effects
1.  Scale effects — negative effects, when increased trade leads to more pollution without compensating
product, technology or policy developments; positive effects, when increased trade induces better
environmental protection through economic growth and policy development that stimulates product
composition and technology shifts that cause less pollution per unit of output.
2.  Structural effects — changes in the patterns of economic activity or micro-economic production,
consumption, investment, or geographic effects from increased trade that either exert positive
environmental effects, (e.g. reducing production of crops that rely on chemical intensive methods, in
favor of more extensive agriculture), or cause negative consequences (e.g. encouraging the drainage
of wetlands to satisfy new trade demands).
3.  Income effects — positive effects increased willingness to pay with increased personal incomes
brought about by growth-induced trade; also increased budgetary resources allocated to
environmental protection both in absolute and relative terms.
4.  Product effects — either positive effects, from increased trade in goods that are environmentally-
beneficial, e.g. biodegradable containers, or negative effects, from more trade in environmentally-
damaging products, e.g. hazardous wastes.
5.  Technology effects — either positive effects from reducing pollution per unit of product, e.g.,
precision farming that reduces excess fertilizer use, or negative effects from the spread of "dirty"
technologies, e.g., highly toxic and persistent pesticides, through trade channels.
6.  Regulatory effects — either through improved environmental policies, in response to economic
growth from enhanced trade or through measures included in the trade agreement, or the relaxation of
existing environmental policies, because of specific trade pressures or restrictions on environmental
policy by trade agreements.
Source:  OECD, 1994 for 1 - 2 and 4 - 6; author for 3.
To better understand how globalization-induced free trade impacts the environment, it is
necessary to examine the channels through which such impacts are transmitted.  There are six
such channels: (a) scale of economic activity; (b) income growth; (c) changes in structure of
economic activity; (d) product composition; (e) technology diffusion; and (f) trade-induced
regulations.  (See Box 1 for a summary of these effects).
Scale effects
To the extent that trade liberalization stimulates economic growth, both the scale of
economic activity and incomes increase.  A larger volume of economic activity would certainly
raise the aggregate level of natural resource use and environmental pollution unless improved
resource efficiency and structural change reduce resource use and pollution intensity per unit of
output more than proportionally.  For given structure and resource use efficiency, the scale
effects on the environment of trade liberalization are unambiguously negative.  Negative scale
effects are more pronounced where there are market failures such as ill defined property rights,
unpriced ecosystems, uninternalized externalities and underprovided public goods.  Policy
failures such as energy subsidies or forced industrialization further exacerbate the scale effects of
trade liberalization.5
Income effects
The gains from trade and trade-induced economic growth result in substantial income
increases which impact the environment in a variety of ways.  First, higher incomes result in both
higher levels of consumption and associated environmental externalities, and in higher
willingness to pay for environmental improvement, and associated increases in both private and
public environmental expenditures.  There is considerable empirical evidence that environmental
quality is income elastic, in the sense that increases in income result in more than proportionate
increases in environmental expenditures.  Second, economic growth makes more resources
available for environmental protection, and raises environmental quality in a country's list of
priorities, prompting governments to increase environmental expenditures both in absolute terms
and as a percentage of GDP.  This is true of virtually all the newly industrializing countries (from
China and South Korea to Mexico and Brazil).  The reverse is also true, when income growth
slows down (as after the recent Asian financial crisis), environmental expenditures tend to fall
more than proportionally.
Third, to the extent that trade and growth benefits are widely distributed, trade
liberalization may help reduce the pressures placed by poverty on the environment through the
encroachment of natural resources.  If, on the other hand, poor people (either rural or urban) are
further marginalized by global competition without access to technology, capital and other
means to compete, encroachment and degradation of natural resources (forest, pastures, fisheries,
public lands) are likely to intensify.  Trade liberalization may actually reinforce the vicious circle
between poverty and environmental degradation, especially when open access resources,
heretofore poor people's last resort source of livelihood, are now being exploited for exports.
Ironically, economic collapse may not reduce the pressure on natural resources, if impoverished
urban dwellers return to the rural areas reclaiming their traditional sources of livelihood as
indeed happened in Thailand and Indonesia following the recent financial crisis.  Finally,
economic growth may result in reform of environmental policies and enactment of new laws and
regulations and new institutions to enforce them.
Studies of the relationship between income levels and environmental degradation, not
controlling for scale and structural change effects, found an inverted U-shape relationship,
especially for localized effects.  (Grossman and Krueger, 1995, Panayotou 1997a).  At low-
income levels (early stages of development), income growth is associated with higher levels of
environmental degradation until a turning point is reached (between US$5,000-10,000) beyond
which further income increases result in environmental improvement.  This finding came to be
known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve, tends to suggest that environmental degradation is a
"growing up" problem to be overcome through rapid economic growth rather than through
targeted environmental policies.  To the extent that free trade speeds up economic growth and
raises per capita incomes, any restrictions on trade or diversions of resources away from export-
led growth slow down the transition to a positive income-environment relationship.
This is clearly a misinterpretation of an empirical relationship that is devoid of policy
significance in its reduced form.  First, it ignores the role of market and policy failures in
determining the level of environmental damage cost per additional unit of GDP, and the scope
for policy reform to reduce it.  Second, it ignores threshold effects and the risk of irreversible
environmental damages were environmental degradation to cross such thresholds before reaching6
the turning point.  Third, current income levels of developing countries are nowhere close to the
turning point, hence environment-intensive production would continue for a long time, resulting
in significant and possibly irreversible environmental damage.
Policy formulation calls for a more analytical and disaggregated approach to the income-
environment relationship.  Once such attempt (Panayotou 1997a) decomposed the income-
environment relationship into: (a) a scale effect which was found to be unambiguously negative;
(b) a pure income effect which was found to be unambiguously positive, and a composition or
structural change effect which was found to be negative at earlier stages of development (shift
from agriculture into industry) and positive at later stages of development (shift from industry to
services).  The speed of income growth was also found to matter, resulting in somewhat higher
levels of environmental degradation per unit of GDP.  However, it was also found that effective
policy intervention is a potent means to reducing the environmental cost of growth at all stages
of economic development.  Thus, while some deterioration of environmental quality is inevitable
along a country’s development path up to the turning point, policy interventions to remove
distortions and mitigate market failures can reduce the environmental cost of growth and hence
of trade and keep it at reversible levels below critical ecological thresholds.
Structural or Composition Effects
Globalization in general and freer trade in particular result in a shift in industrial structure
more in line with a country's comparative advantage.  In the absence of market and policy
failures, the composition of output under free trade would be better suited to a country's
environmental resource endowment than under austerity.  Controlling for scale effects and for
stage of development, trade liberalization tends to make the structure of the economy less
pollution-intensive to speed up the transition from resource extraction and processing to light
manufacturing and eventually services.  Since most developing countries are more richly
endowed in low-cost labor than any other factor of production, trade liberalization tends to shift
labor-intensive activities to developing countries.  Indeed, Hettige, Lucas and Wheeler (1992)
found that toxic intensity increased more rapidly in inward-looking developing countries, while
outward-oriented, high-growth developing countries had a slowly increasing or declining toxic
intensity of manufacturing.  They found that highly protected economies had experienced rapid
growth in capital-intensive smokestack sectors, while more open economies had experienced
high growth in less pollution-intensive, more labor-intensive activities.
Developing countries may also have significant national resource endowments and
income-constrained demand for environmental quality. The extent to which trade liberalization
would contribute to sustainable development, under these conditions, depends critically on
whether environmental assets are properly valued, and these values are somehow been taken into
account by world markets.  Otherwise, trade liberalization may result in structural shifts towards
increased specialization in unsustainable activities.  A recent study by Strutt and Anderson (1998),
however, found that, even under business as usual scenario (i.e., no change in resource pricing or
environmental regulation), implementation of the Uruguay Round trade reforms would have a
positive impact on natural resource in developing countries and most other regimes of the world
except for Western Europe where resource policies are well developed and can cope with any
increase in resource exploitation (see Table 1).7
Product and Technology Effects
Liberalized trade facilitates the diffusion of products, technologies and processes across
borders.  The environmental impacts of this diffusion depends on the characteristics of the
products and technologies that are being diffused.  The trade in products that are patently
harmful to the environment such as toxic chemicals, hazardous waste, endangered species and
disease bearing pests is strictly regulated or prohibited by international conventions.  A very
important channel through which globalization impacts the environment is the trade in
environmentally preferred “producer” and “consumer” goods.  The global market for
environmental goods and services is around $300 billion annually and is expected to grow
rapidly (OECD 1996).  Trade liberalization expands the potential market for both more efficient
capital equipment and “cleaner” production technologies on the production side and “greener”
products, such as organic foods, low-emission vehicles and recyclables, on the consumption side.
While other dimensions of globalization, such as investment, intellectual property rights
and economic integration have technology implications that impact the environment, three-
quarters of all technology transfer arise from trade flows (OECD 1995), especially the trade in
machinery and equipment, which amounts to almost 40 percent of total global trade (UN 1996).
These trade flows result in diffusion of more efficient (and one hopes cleaner) technologies:
almost 80 percent of the global trade in machinery and equipment comes from developed
countries and about a third is imported by developing countries (UN 1996).  Technology
diffusion also takes place through the trade in services such as engineering and consulting
services and technology licensing.
Table 1.  Percentage changes in resource-sector output levels in various regions of the
















Paddy rice -0.3 2.9 -1.3 -1.0 -3.1 0.48
Non-grain crops -4.6 4.3 -0.4 2.0 -2.9 0.59
Livestock 0.1 -1.4 -1.6 0.9 1.2 -0.06
Forestry -1.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.0 1.9 -0.03
Fisheries -0.7 -7.4 0.1 -0.4 5.1 -0.21
Coal -7.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.3 1.0 -0.03
Oil -3.3 -2.9 0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.04
Gas -3.4 -1.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.06
Other minerals -5.2 -5.0 -1.4 -1.4 1.9 -0.39
Source:  Strutt and Anderson (1998)8
Liberalized trade contributes not only to technology diffusion and transfer but also to
technological progress through economies of scale, enhanced incentives to innovate and less
duplication of research and development efforts due to fewer protectionist barriers (Grossman
and Helpman 1995).
Does the trade-induced generation and diffusion of technology benefits or harms the
environment?  The technology-environment relationship is a complex one consisting of both
demand and supply factors and policy effects.  On the demand side, pressures by regulators,
customers, shareholders and the community drive firms to demand technology with
environmental characteristics such as "cleaner" production technology and pollution-abatement
equipment.  While regulatory and community pressures usually aim at process characteristics,
customers pressure is directed towards product characteristics.  Studies of firm behavior in
developed countries tend to find regulatory pressure as the most potent driver of
environmentally-preferred technologies (e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky,1996) while studies of
firm behavior in developing countries tend to find community pressures as the most important
determinant of firms' environmental behavior (Pargal and Wheeler, 1995; Panayotou et al 1997).
On the supply side, environment-related technological change is driven by abatement costs and
the ability of innovating firms to benefit from environmental damage mitigation (which in turn
depends on the regulatory regime) and to appropriate the benefits from innovation with wider
applications (which in turn depends on the intellectual property right regime).  According to
Johnstone (1997), in addition to these factors the level of industrial research and development is
likely to be an important factor in the supply of environment-relevant technological innovations.
Indeed, Nentjes and Wiersma (1987) found that the most active industries in environment related
R&D were the chemicals, petroleum and machinery and vehicles.
Finally, environmental policy plays a key role in both the technological innovation.
Clarity, predictability and stability of environmental policy are critical for the necessary
investments to take place.  Equally important is the flexibility of the policy instruments to allow
firms to seek the least-cost methods of compliance, to take advantage of costs differentials in
pollution abatement and to benefit from continuous innovation.  In this regard, market-based
instruments such as pollution taxes and tradable permits have significant advantage over
command and control regulations.  The case has also been made for a mixed system of pollution
taxes to internalize the negative environmental externality of pollution and technological
innovation subsidies to encourage the positive technological innovation externality (Johnstone
1997).
Regulatory effects
The regulatory effects of trade liberalization on the environment arise from (a) improved
environmental policies, standards and enforcement in response to economic growth from
enhanced trade; (b) environmental measures included in trade agreements; and (c) relaxation of
existing environmental policies due to specific trade pressures or restrictions on environmental
policies by trade agreements.
With regard to the first effect above, World Bank research based on data from 145
countries has found a positive association between economic growth and environmental9
regulation and security of property rights.  With regard to the second effect, NAFTA
demonstrates how trade liberalization can serve as a catalyst for improvements in both the level
and the enforcement of environmental regulations.  Trade agreements in general may promote
harmonization of environmental standards and influence policies towards environmental
subsidies and environment-related fiscal and trade measures.  While the multilateral trading
system encourages the use of international standards, and allows for higher levels of
environmental protection, there is a widespread fear that trade liberalization and the resulting
strife for competitiveness would "drag down" environmental standards in a race towards the
bottom.  There is no evidence that this has happened thus far.
Empirical evidence
There are many analytical studies of the effects of trade liberalization on the environment
(e.g. Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1997) but few empirical studies.  A recent OECD (Sprenger,
1997) study has simply indicated the likely direction of the various impacts.  The scale of
economic activity has, as one would expect, unambiguously detrimental effects on the
environment while technology and income have beneficial effects (see Table 2).  Since these
effects are in opposite direction and the remaining impacts (structural and product effects) are
ambiguous, it is not possible to determine the net effect of trade on the environment in the
absence of quantitative assessment of these impacts.
One attempt to quantify the effects of trade liberalization on the environment is a recent
study by Strutt and Anderson (1998) on Indonesia.  Using a modified version of the global
general equilibrium model (GGE) known as GTAP they project the world economy to 2010 and
2020 with and without trade reforms.  The effects of trade liberalization on the Indonesian
environment (air and water pollution) are traced through a special environmental module
attached to the Indonesian part of the GTAP.  They, then, identify the effects on key air and
water quality indicators of changes in the level and consumption of output and in production
technology arising from (a) full global implementation of Uruguay Round commitments by 2010
and (b) additional move to MFN free trade by APEC countries by 2020.  Without the trade
reforms, the aggregate activity (scale) effects of economic growth on pollution are, as expected,
positive and the technology effect negative; the intersectoral composition (or structural effects
are mixed but mostly positive (see Table 3).  The scale effects dominate.  The implementation of
the Uruguay Round trade reforms result in intersectoral composition (structural change) effects
that dominate the scale effect, and result in reduction in pollution levels except for suspended
solids (see Table 4).  The authors conclude for Indonesia that "trade policy reforms slated for the
next two decades in many cases would improve the environment (at least with respect to air and
water pollution) and reduce the depletion of natural resources, and in the worst cases add only
slightly to environmental degradation and resource depletion even without toughening the
enforcement of environmental regulations or adding new ones.  The economic gains from the
trade reforms and the scope for adopting well-targeted environmental and resource policies to
reduce any serious damage are such that the social welfare almost certainly is going to be
improved substantially by these liberalizations” (Strut and Anderson 1998, p. 13-14).10
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•  Scale effects Change in the volume of exports
and imports; increase in cross-
border transport
(+,-) (+) (+)
•  Structural effects Change in the composition of
exports and imports; increase in
cross-border transport
(+,-) (+,-) (+,-)
•  Product effects Change in the composition of
exports and imports; increase in
cross-border transport
(+,-) (+,-) (+,-)
•  Technology effects Change in the composition of
exports and imports; increase in
cross-border transport
(+,-) (-) (-)
Source:  Sprenger, Rolf-Ulrich "Globalization, Employment and Environment" OECD Proceedings,
OECD Paris 1997.11
Table 3.  Decomposition of Changes in pollution as a consequence of economic growth and












Carbon (kt) 65,346 [134] 104,607 10,149 -49,409
Sulphur (kt) 799 [132] 1,302 214 -716
Nitrogen (kt) 7,427 [162] 1,897 392 -862
Water in (bm
3)
b -12 [-4] 685 -388 -309
Water out (bm
3)
b 0.8 [126] 1.3 0.7 -1
BOD (kt) 81 [52] 337 176 -433
COD (kt) 341 [64] 1,149 726 -1,534
DS (kt) -17 [-46] 79 -47 -48











Carbon (kt) 63,982 [56] 107,244 16,904 -60,166
Sulphur (kt) 707 [50] 1,323 276 -893
Nitrogen (kt) 1,495 [65] 2,165 366 -1,035
Water in (bm
3)
b -109 [-36] 296 -167 -236
Water out (bm
3)
b 0.4 [29] 1.3 1.0 -2
BOD (kt) -13 [-5] 223 146 -382
COD (kt) 2 [-0] 822 587 -1,412
DS (kt) -13 [-65] 19 -12 -19.5
SS (kt) -211 [-37] 545 474 -1,231
aPercentages changes from base case are shown in square parentheses.
bThis does not include the change in household water use.
Source:  A. Strutt and K. Anderson, "Will Trade Liberalization Harm the Environment?  The
Case of Indonesia to 2020."  Seminar Paper 98-04 Center for International Economic Studies,
University of Adelaide, May 1998.12
Table 4:  Decomposition of pollution effects from Uruguay Round trade reform (including in
China), Indonesia, 2010 (% change from 2010 baseline level shown in curved parentheses, % of


























































































Source:  Strutt and Anderson (1998)13
The commonly used Strut and Anderson approach of using a side environmental module,
rather than a fully integrated emissions-damage-abatement feedback system, has been criticized
by Smith and Espinosa (1996).  The latter using a new GGE model for the European Union that
incorporates local and transboundary externalities illustrates how environmental and trade
policies become intertwined. The model is extended to include three air pollutants (PM, NOx,
SOx) and their health effects on influences on household preferences.  They then evaluate the
welfare implications of a 50 percent reciprocal reduction of non-tariff barriers for durables traded
between UK and each of its EU trading partners, combined with a 25 percent increase in
emission rates reflecting the entry of marginal plants in response to trade liberalization.  When
the effects of emissions on morbidity, and of morbidity on labor endowments and threshold
demand for services are ignored, the balance of trade to GDP ratio is positive.  When the income
and substitution effects of health damages from pollution are considered (including mortality) the
welfare implication of the 50 percent reduction in non-tariff barriers (as measured by the ratio of
balance of trade to GDP) turns negative (see Table 5).  Ignoring the air-pollution induced effects
on morbidity results in 12 percent overstatement of the gains relative to GDP.  Thus when the
gains from trade are considered, trade liberalization enhances social welfare, if the
accompanying increase in air pollution and its health effects are considered, there may be net
welfare loss, depending on the magnitude of increase, the sector affected and the nature of
environmental impacts.
Allowing for the environmental impacts of emissions and their feedbacks to the economy
via revaluation of endowments or changes in rents and substitutions for other marketed goods,
result also in larger increase in emissions.  As shown in section B of Table 5, in the absence of
exogenously specified increase in emissions, trade liberalization (50 percent reduction in non-
tariff barriers) result in 3 times higher increase in particulates and an increase rather than a
reduction in NOx and SOx.  It is also of interest that Germany, a UK trading partner, enjoys
smaller welfare gains from trade when the impact of the increased output on emissions and the
transboundary effects of emissions from the UK on Germany are considered (see Table 5).
Is there a Case for Trade Measures to Protect the Environment?
1
As GATT has gone beyond tariffs, quotas and other border instruments to be concerned
with internal policies and measures such as standards, production subsidies, and intellectual
property rights, environmental concerns and policies began to be projected beyond national
borders even when no transboundary or global impacts are involved.  Whether the underlying
motivation is to counter "unfair trade" practices, to disguise protectionism or to advance a
genuine environmental concern, trade contraction, rather than trade expansion has come to be
viewed as the way to go.  For example, Subramanian (1992) reports that "of the 48 bills on
environmental matters introduced in the 101
st Congress in the United States, 33 included
provisions affecting international trade of which 31 took the form of restrictive trade measures. "
(p. 135).
                                                
1 It draws heavily on Subramanian (1992).14
Table 5.  Welfare implications and environmental effects of trade liberalization (50 percent
reduction in non-tariff barriers for durables)
Market effects only (no
environmental effects)
Non-market environmental
effects and feedbacks added
I.  United Kingdom
  A.  Welfare change
1.  Balance of Trade/GDP (%)
(excluding mortality)
0.198 0.177
2.  Balance of Trade/GDP (%)
(including mortality)
0.198 -0.166
B.  Environmental effects







  A.  Welfare change
1.  Balance of Trade/GDP (%)
(excluding mortality)
0.013 0.012
2.  Balance of Trade/GDP (%)
(including mortality)
0.013 0.007
Source:  K. Smith and J.A. Espinosa "Environmental and Trade Policies:  Some Methodological
Lessons"  Environment and Development Economics (1996):  19-40, 1996.
Trade measures may take the form of either direct trade interventions or supporting trade
provisions.  Direct trade interventions usually aim at the environmental externality, e.g. US
import ban on dolphin-unsafe Mexican Tuna (bilateral) or trade ban on endangered species under
CITES Convention or trade restrictions on hazardous wastes under the Basel Convention
(multilateral).
Direct trade interventions may also aim at compensating for environment-related loss of
competitiveness.  One such example is the Boren Proposal (Senator Boren’s proposed pollution
Deterrence Act of 1991) for automatic levying of countervailing duties on imports from
countries with low environmental standards.  Also, GATT’s border tax adjustment rules allow
the use of trade measures to offset taxes imposed on environmental grounds.  Supporting trade
provisions are trade measures aiming to assist the enforcement of a related action or provision.
For example, Denmark banned the imports of soft drinks bottled in non-reusable containers to
enforce a domestic consumption ban.  The Montreal Protocol restricts trade of CFC-related
products with non-signatories to enforce the production and consumption obligations on the
signatories.15
Trade measures may also be used as rewards and punishments for inducing a
change in environmental behavior, participation in an international environmental
agreements or compliance with its provisions.  They may take the form of sanctions as in
the case of the Pelly Amendment which authorizes trade measures against unrelated
products for failing to observe US tuna fishing methods.  Sanctions have also been
threatened against countries to force them to raise or lower their standards.  For example,
the US has threatened withdrawal of concessions to EU to force it to lower its hormone
standards on beef products.  Finally trade inducements may take the form of incentives as
in the case of NAFTA, whereby Mexico is provided with increased market access in
exchange for raising its environmental standards, in general, and for reducing transborder
pollution, in particular.
  Are all the above uses of trade measures in the name of the environment
(summarized in Table 6) justified or do they constitute disguised protectionism at worst, or
inefficient instruments at best?  Subramanian (1992) analyzed the use of trade measures
for the environment and reached the following conclusions:  First, with regards to
domestic environmental problems, the use of trade measures aims to negate a source of
comparative advantage which is legitimately "conferred by differences in environmental
endowments, pollution assimilation capacities, or social preferences regarding
environmental outcomes" (Subramanian 1992, p. 151).  Therefore the intent of trade
measures in relation to domestic environmental problems is largely protectionist.
Second, with regard to transboundary environmental problems trade measures are
inefficient and often inequitable instruments for correcting market failures.  Assignment of
property rights, creation of markets and production or consumption interventions are
superior to trade interventions.  Trade restrictions imply unilateral allocation of property
rights which may also be unfair to poor countries and counterproductive for environmental
outcomes if income and environmental quality are positively related.
Third, trade measures have, however, a useful role to play in securing participation
in compliance with multilateral environmental agreements.  The threatened use of trade
sanctions may be sufficient to alter the behavior of would-be free riders.  In general, the
use of trade restrictive measures for environmental purposes is generally more legitimate
when it is multilateral and aims at enlisting participation and compliance for addressing
global environmental problems.  Appendix Table A.1 lists selected Multilateral Trade
Agreements with possible trade effects or trade measures aiming to protect the
environment (e.g. CITES) or to secure compliance (e.g. Montreal Protocol).17
Table 6.  Interactions Between Trade and Environment
Type of measure Features Transborder Domestic
1.  Direct Trade Interventions
(a) Unilateral Aimed to impact directly on the
substantive problem; either the loss in
competitiveness or the environmental
externality; restrictive action will have
penalizing effects (incidental or
otherwise) on actions creating the
pollution.
(a) US import ban on Mexican Tuna,
EC's threatened ban against exports
of tropical timber and against fur
products produced from animals
caught in leghold traps.
(a) Countervailing duty against
products produced under alleged
'low standards' (e.g. Boren
Initiative).  Export subsidies for
pollution equipment.
(b) Multilateral (b) Trade ban on Ivory and on several
other endangered species under the
CITES Convention.  Trade
restrictions in Basel Convention on
Hazardous Wastes.
(b) Proposals in the Uruguay Round to
exempt certain kinds of production
subsidies for pollution abatement
from countervailing action.
Multilaterally sanctioned use of trade
measures to offset production taxes
imposed on environmental grounds
as the Superfund Panel Case.
2.  Supporting Trade Provisions
(a) Unilateral Intended to enforce other actions or
interventions, which address the
substantive problem or externality;
action by its nature will be in the
related area and could have incidental
penalizing effects.
(a) Circle of Poison Act intended to
stop exports of harmful pesticides
on the grounds that they may be
used in products which are
reimported; import ban to enforce
domestic consumption ban or
domestic standards (e.g. Danish
beer bottles case).
(b) Multilateral (b) Trade restrictions against non-
signatories of Montreal Protocol.
National actions that are sanctioned
multilaterally.18
Table 6.  Interactions Between Trade and Environment, cont'd
Type of measure Features Transborder Domestic
      Trade Inducements
3A.  Sanctions:
(a) Unilateral Actions intended to change
environmental behavior and taken in
unrelated areas; hence substitutable in
principle by equivalent actions, e.g.
financial sanctions for trade sanctions
and technology transfer for trade
incentives.  Often sanctions will only be
threatened and, if credible and
effective, need not be taken.
(a) Pelly Amendment to US
Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967
and Packward-Magnuson
Amendment to the US Fisherman's
Protective Act of 1967 under which
imports of fish products in general
can be restricted or prohibited.
(e.g. Recent US action against
Japan for policies endangering the
sea turtle.)
(a) Use of trade restrictions to raise
pollution standards abroad; use of
trade restrictions to lower
standards, e.g. threatened US
actions in Beef Hormone case.
(b) Multilateral (b) None so far.
3B.  Incentives
(a) Unilateral
(b) Multilateral (b) US-Mexican NAFTA negotiations
for of market access in return for
reduced transborder pollution.
(b) US-Mexico NAFTA negotiations
for provision of market access in
return for higher standards
Source:  Subramanian, A.  "Trade Measures for Environment:  A Nearly Empty Box?"  The World Economy, January 1992, Vol. 15. No. 1.19
Environment and Trade
Do environmental regulations act as barriers to trade?  Do multilateral trade rules permit
restrictions of trade for environmental purposes?
Globalization in general and trade liberalization in particular has accorded previously purely
domestic policies international importance.  Included among such policies are competition policy,
intellectual property rights and environmental policy.  Furthermore, the reduction of tariff barriers
has heightened the relative importance of non-tariff barriers as potential constraints on trade.  At the
same time, protectionist forces having lost the use of tariff barriers are inclined to focus their
attention on non-tariff barriers.  Environmental concerns, because of their emotive nature are a prime
candidate.  This in turn has raised concerns that some environmental measures might be disguised
protectionism?  Sorting out legitimate environmental policy from disguised protectionism is not
easy.  For example, some environmental regulations such a tax on imported large cars or a subsidy
for pollution abatement afford protection to domestic producers and reduce imports.
Multilateral trade rules make a fundamental distinction between (a) products standards
and (b) process and production methods (PPM’s).  The two are treated very differently: national
requirements on product standards and product-related PPM’s are allowed, on non-product
related PPM’s they are not.  We examine these in turn.
Product Standards
Multilateral trade rules permit national requirements for products to meet certain
environmental, safety, and health standards provided that they are transparent and non-
discriminatory between domestic and foreign sources.  Taxes and charges for environmental or other
resources are permitted to be imposed on important products and to except exports as an application
of the principle of national sovereignty.  Border adjustments are permitted: the consumption of a
product that can cause environmental damage may be taxed provided that the tax is applied in a
transparent and non-discriminatory manner.  Packaging and recycling requirements are more
controversial as they are part of a domestic-focused waste reduction policy that can impose higher
costs on importers; as such it is acting as a non-trade barrier to trade.  The trade effects of this policy
can be mitigated by giving advanced notice to allow foreign suppliers to adjust.
Given their direct impacts on trade, product standards are prime candidates for
harmonization.  Two agreements of the WTP system, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade and the Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure encourage
harmonization of product standards and where possible, adherence to international standards.
Process and Production Methods
2
How natural resources are extracted or products are produced can have significant
environmental impacts which countries attempt to control through harvesting restrictions,
emission controls and specified production techniques.  Extending such production-methods-
                                                
2 Based on Adams (1997).20
based standards (or taxes and charges) to imported products raise trade issues and conflict with
the principle of national sovereignty: one country attempts to enforce a particular production
method (that does not affect the final product) on another country.
If the method of production affects the characteristic of the imported product, border tax
adjustments are allowed under WTO rules, i.e. product-related PPM’s are treated in the same
way as product standards.  Charges or standards on non-product related PPM's (i.e. on
production methods that do not affect the product characteristics) violate the principle that “like
products” must be accorded “like treatment,” and are prohibited by WTO rules. Border tax
adjustments or countervailing duties for non-product related PPM’s are not allowed, i.e. the
prices of imported products cannot be adjusted for the extra cost incurred by the domestic
industry operating under such requirements.
Thus, differences in domestic environmental policies are seen as part of the many
variations that constitute a country’s comparative advantage and do not justify compensating
levies or export rebates to offset price differences.  Where transboundary and global
environmental issues are concerned harmonization of non-product PPM requirements may be
necessary, at least on a consensual basis, as in the context of regional or multilateral agreement.
An interesting issue currently under consideration is the potential for using border tax
adjustments in combination with domestic process taxes to reduce greenhouse gases (Adams
1997).
In conclusion, unlike “product standards,” “methods standards” are not candidates for
harmonization; it would be both more difficult to do so and less beneficial.  While some
convergence is to be expected over time, production methods and solutions to local
environmental problems are best tailored to local conditions.  Yet the globalization of
environmental concerns such as tropical deforestation and biodiversity loss pits the emerging
product life-cycle perspective whereby consumers want to know the overall environmental
characteristics of the products they buy against conventional notions of national sovereignty and
of products as their physical characteristics (Adams 1997).
Does Environmental Policy Influence the Pattern of Trade?
Since differences in environmental policies and standards and their enforcement is
translated into production cost differences, it is a legitimate concern that such differences may
alter the pattern of trade.  There is substantial evidence, however, that differences in
environmental standards and environmental control costs have had very limited effect on trade
patterns.  The main reason is that environmental control costs are a very small fraction of
production costs.  Any comparative advantage created by lax environmental standards is
overwhelmed by other sources of comparative advantage such as differences in resource
endowments, technologies, human and physical capital, infrastructure and the macroeconomic
policy environment.  For example, Walter (1973) found that environmental control costs (ECC)
amounted, on average, to 1.75% of the total value of US exports and 1.52% of US imports.
Robison (1988) estimates the average EEC as a share of total exports as 0.37% in 1973 and
0.72% in 1982 and finds that a doubling in EEC sots has negligible impacts on output and trade;
the trade balance is reduced by only 0.67%.  Low (1992) has found that the traditionally lenient21
environmental standards in Mexico did not result in specialization in dirty industries.  Grossman
and Krueger (1993) found that pollution abatement costs in the US have not affected US imports
from Mexico.  If this is the case with Mexico and the US, which share a long common border,
have a large volume of trade, and have substantially different environmental standards, it is
unlikely that environmental regulations have a significant impact on net exports in other cases
either.
Another test of the relationship between environmental regulations and competitiveness
is whether an increasing share of trade in pollution-intensive products comes from developing
countries, which on the whole have more relaxed environmental laws (or more lax enforcement).
While the share in world trade of pollution-intensive products from North America fell from 21
to 14 percent and that of Southeast Asia rose from 3 to 8 percent during 1965-1988 (Low and
Yeats 1992), these trends are more indicative of increased demand for pollution-intensive
products in newly industrializing countries than any shift of pollution-intensive production to
developing countries.
Capital Flows, Foreign Investment and Environment
Capital flows in general, and direct foreign investment in particular, are major
channels through which globalization impacts the environment.  Foreign investment is a
major vehicle of economic integration, technology diffusion and trade expansion.  Globally,
capital flows are larger than trade flows.  Nearly 20 billion US dollars a day or 7 billion
dollars a year cross national borders.  Private capital flows to developing countries in 1996
were six times the official development assistance (ODA), accounting for 86 percent of the
total capital  flows to these countries (World Bank 1997).  Unlike ODA, which has been
steadily falling, private capital flows have been rising steadily right up to the recent financial
crisis.  Private capital flows are driven by the opportunity to earn a commercial return.  These
opportunities have increased considerably in the past decade as an increasing number of
countries assume a greater market orientation and began to privatize state enterprises and to
welcome foreign investment.
However, private capital flows, being motivated by market opportunities rather than
capital needs or developing priorities, tend to be concentrated in a dozen or so emerging
economies and to avoid poor countries with high risk and undeveloped institutions and poor
infrastructure.  Moreover, private capital flows are not usually guided by sustainability
considerations and are indeed very volatile and sensitive to changing market conditions.
Furthermore, there is little information available about their environmental and social impacts.
Of the nearly 280 billion US dollars of private capital flows to developing countries, 45
percent were accounted by foreign direct investment, 33 percent by debt finance and 19 percent by
portfolio equity investments.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) goes mostly into manufacturing
plants, mining development, power stations, telecommunications, port development, airport and
road construction, water supply, and sanitation, all of which have environmental and natural
resource use implications.  As such, FDI has the most direct and pronounced links to and effects on
the environment and sustainable development.  It is also a primary vehicle of technology transfer.
Portfolio equity investments have only indirect links to the environment through their effect on the22
value of companies that they are directed to.  If they build up the value of companies with high
environmental performance, they have positive impacts; if instead, they put pressure for short-term
profitability, they create disincentive for environmental performance.  Debt financing or
commercial lending to private companies gives the lender a stake in the borrower's financial
performance, which may be affected by environmental risks.  This is not usually the case with
investors in government bonds since the governments' solvency is usually unrelated to its
environmental performance (Gentry et al 1996).
Private capital flows are highly concentrated (Table 7).  Developing countries received only
about a quarter of global FDI and portfolio flows, and within the developing world, twelve countries
in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe received 80 percent of the total flows to developing
countries; sub-Saharan Africa, arguably the region with the greatest need for capital infusion, re-
ceived only 2 percent of these flows.  At the other extreme, China receives more than half of all FDI
that goes to Asia and a third of the global capital flows to developing countries.
What does the rapid growth of private flows mean for sustainable development?  First, pri-
vate capital flows are not a substitute for ODA, since poor countries that need them most attract the
least.  Moreover, private investment is not automatically channeled to sustainable development ac-
tivities.  To the contrary, the social and environmental areas traditionally have been among the ac-
tivities least attracted to foreign investors, partly because of government regulations that limited
foreign (and even domestic) private sector involvement.  Moreover, without enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations and freedom to charge user fees or raise tariffs to cover costs (including an
acceptable reform to capital), these sectors are not attractive to private capital.
However, during the past five to seven years, a number of positive changes, such as deregu-
lation, privatization, and financial innovation have increased the availability and attractiveness of
these sectors to both domestic and foreign private capital.  The development of innovative financing
strategies such as build-own-transfer (BOT), build-own-operate (BOO), and build-own-lease (BOL),
etc. have made it possible for the private sector to enter into infrastructure development, while the
increased use of competitive bidding, coupled with environmental performance bonds or bank guar-
antees has improved the efficiency and environmental performance of FDI and hence its contributions
to sustainable development.  The past five years have witnessed a strong trend toward privatization of
state-owned enterprises and public utilities, concessions to private developers of infrastructure
inducing power generation, transportation, water supply and sanitation, and waste treatment, among
others.  The privatization of electric utilities in Argentina and concessions to private developers for
public transport and waste management in Thailand and for water and sanitation in the Philippines are
cases in point.  Indeed, there is a clear trend in the 1990s of FDI shifting from resource extractive
industries to environmental services that are generally more environmentally benign.23
Table 7.  Leading host economies for FDI, 1985-1995 (based on cumulative inflows)
Rank Country FDI billion $
1 United States 477.5

















19 Hong Kong 17.9
20 Denmark 15.7
Source:  As cited in WTO, 1996
The net effect of FDI and portfolio investment on the environment and sustainable
development is difficult to determine in the absence of data and quantitative models.  On the one
hand, FDI provides risk capital that contributes to economic growth, employment (see Table 9)
and poverty alleviation; it also creates positive externalities in terms of increased competition,
improved management skills, and access to greener markets and cleaner technologies.
On the other hand, fears have been expressed that foreign direct investment gravitates toward
countries with lower environmental standards or lax enforcement (“pollution haven” hypothesis).
Alternatively, capital mobility results in lower environmental standards as governments compete
with each other to attract scarce investment by lowering environmental standards below efficient
levels (“race to the bottom” hypothesis).
On theoretical grounds, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1997) argued that capital mobility does
not lead to a “race for the bottom” if the economy is competitive and distortion free and there are
no constraints on the use of tax instruments.  Capital mobility does not enter a government’s
benefit-cost analysis calculus in choosing environmental standards if the first-best instrument of a
tax or user fee is available and can be set equal to the cost that a firm’s operations impose on the24
country.  This cost includes the cost of providing public goods and services to the firm as well as
the use of the environment for waste disposal (environmental cost).  Weaker environmental
standards may attract additional (foreign) investment but this will neither benefit nor harm the
country since firms subject to an optimal (Pigovian) tax fully and efficiently compensate the
country for any environmental cost associated with their investment (Bhagwati and Srinivasan,
1997).  But of course, economies are neither fully competitive nor undistorted.  The authors show
that even monopoly power in capital and product markets does not destroy this benchmark
efficiency; as long as the government can use tax instruments to exploit its market power, it is
free to set its environmental policy efficiently.  It is only when governments fail to tax capital
efficiently that environmental policy becomes distorted; if governments overtax capital they may
have an incentive to lower environmental standards to attract capital.
Is there evidence that lax environmental standards actually attract more foreign
investment?  Repeated tests of the "pollution haven" hypothesis failed to find evidence of a
systematic tendency of manufacturing plants to be located in countries with lax environmental
standards.  In choosing how much to invest and where, firms take into account many factors in
addition to environmental regulations, such as size of the local market, the quality of the labor
force, the available infrastructure, ability to repatriate profits, political stability, and the risk of
expropriation.  In this context, evidence indicates that the stringency or laxity of environmental
regulations is insignificant as a determinant of location decisions.  Indeed, Wheeler and Mody
(1992) found that multinational firms base their investment decisions primarily on labor costs
and market access, while corporate tax rates and, by extension, environmental control costs play
little or no role.  In a World Economic Forum survey in 1997, 3,000 business executives from 53
countries were asked to rank environmental regulations and 26 non-environmental factors,
ranging from government tax and investment policies to the quality of the workforce and
infrastructure as to their role in their investment location decisions.  The stringency of
environmental regulations ranked 22
nd.  Figure 2 slows the importance attached to environmental
regulations compared to 11 of the non-environmental factions.  (A complete list of factors
affecting industrial locations is given in Figure 3.)  Thus executives who actually make
investment location decisions report that environmental regulations do not figure significantly in
those decisions.  Similar results have been obtained by many surveys of the importance of
environmental regulation in plant location decisions in the United States (see Table 8).
The results of these surveys are corroborated by ex post analysis of foreign direct
investment in pollution-intensive industry.  If environmental regulations affect FDI location
decisions, we would expect foreign direct investment in pollution-intensive sectors to account for
a larger share of foreign direct investment from countries with stringent environmental
regulations today than it did in the 1960s or 1970s.  Repetto (1995) showed that the reverse is
true.  He concluded that, to the extent that “greener” countries seem to be exporting their “dirty”
industries, they are predominantly sending them to each other, not to developing countries with
weaker regulations.  In 1995, only 5 percent of US direct investment in developing countries was
in pollution-intensive sectors, compared to 24 percent in developed countries with equally
stringent (compared to the US) environmental regulations.25
Table 8: Surveys of the Importance of Environmental Regulations to Plant Location in the
United States
Survey Sample Result
Epping (1986) Survey of manufacturers (late 1970s)
that located facilities 1958-1977
"Favorable pollution laws" ranked 43
rd to
47
th, out of 54 location factors presented.
Fortune (1977) Fortune's 1977 survey of 1,000
largest U.S. corporations
11% ranked state or local environmental
regulations among top 5 factors
Schmenner (1982) Sample of Dun & Backstreet data for
new Fortune 500 branch plants
opening 1972-1978
Environmental concerns not among the top
6 items mentioned
Wintner (1982) Conference Board survey of 68
urban manufacturing firms
29  (43%) mentioned environmental and
pollution control regulations as a factor in
location choice
Stafford (1985) Interviews and questionnaire
responses of 162 branch plants built
in the late 1970s and early 1980s
"Environmental regulations re not a major
factor," but more important than in 1970.
When only self-described "less clean" plants
were examined, environmental regulations
were "of mid-level importance."
Alexander Grant
(various years)
Surveys of industry associations Environmental compliance costs given an
average weight of below 4%, though
growing slightly over time.
Lyne (1990) Site Selection magazine's 1990
survey of corporate real estate
executives
Asked to pick 3 of 12 factors affecting
location choice, 42% of executives selected
"state clean air legislation."
Source:  Levinson (1997)26

































Source:  Executive Survey, World Economic Forum (1997) in Panayotou and Vincent (1997).27




• Proximity to market
• Preservation and/or expansion
of market share
• Import restrictions and other
trade barriers
• Developing of new market
• Avoiding foreign exchange
risk
• Securing stable supply of raw
materials and natural resources
• Social security contributions










• General social conditions
• Unionization
• Risk of strikes
• Public acceptance of new
technologies
• Quality of living conditions
• Environmental quality
• Infrastructure for leisure
activities
Source:  Sprenger, 1997.
To the contrary, there is a growing evidence that foreign-owned firms or joint ventures
tend to be cleaner than local firms (in general and state owned enterprises in particular) for at
least five reasons: (a) the usually higher environmental standards of the developed countries are
embedded in the technology of the overseas subsidiary (it is too costly to design different
production processes for each location and regulatory regime); (b) they export to
environmentally sensitive markets; (c) a degree of control is exercised by parent firms that do not
want their image to be tarnished by environmentally irresponsible overseas operations; (d) in
case of environmental accidents, they may still be subject to liability claims; and (e) pollution-
intensive industries happened to be among the least footloose industries.  Furthermore, foreign
investors exhibit a strong preference for a stable and predictable policy environment, which
requires clear, transparent and consistently enforced environmental regulations approaching
international standards.  Having invested in the cleaner technology of the advanced countries,
multinational firms have an incentive to lobby for higher environmental standards to raise the
costs of their domestic rivals.  Thus the cleaner technology of the multinational firms constitutes
another argument for the liberalization of capital controls and encouragement of capital flow.
Despite the likely positive influence of FDI on a country's environmental policy, the
environmental performance of FDI cannot be taken for granted; it should be continuously
monitored, as should that of domestic firms.  FDI that is made in the absence of effective
environmental policy, like any other type of investment, can result in environmental degradation,
especially if the FDI flows are so large as to overwhelm the regulatory capacity of usually weak
environmental authorities.  As seen in Table 9, FDI inflows are "most likely" to add to pollution
and resource use even as they increase employment (and hence curtail resource encroachment)
and reduce pollution arising from transboundary transport.28
In conclusion, the overall net effects of a foreign direct investment on the environment
and sustainability of host countries could be positive or negative.  On the one hand, FDI
generates employment, growth and wealth that makes larger investments in environmental
protection possible, and it may even reduce pollution per unit of output through cleaner
technology.  On the other hand, it leads to increased industrial production and hence increased
aggregate pollution levels (scale effect) as well as increased consumption of pollution goods
such as electricity, fossil fuels for automobiles, etc.
Since developing countries need both more investment and more improvements of their
environmental performance, it behooves them to design a clear, transparent, stable and
consistently applied environmental regulatory system that can serve as an attraction for foreign
investors who want to be able to predict their costs and returns and to be assured that these costs
are stable and common to all competitors.
Table 9.  "Most Likely" impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on employment and
environment in OECD (home) countries
Anticipated pollution
/resource use effects . . . Globalization-related
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Reduction in local output; increase in
imports of final products; increase in
cross-border transport
(-) (-) (+)
•  Export substitution Reduction or change in the
composition of output for export;
(-) (-) (+)
•  Re-imports Reduction in output; increase in





Increase in output of intermediate





Increase/no change in output;
increase in cross border transport
(+,-) (+,-) (+,-)
FDI inflows
•  Mergers or
acquisitions
Shift in output; reduction in imports
and cross-border transport
(+,-) (+,-) (-)
•  Greenfield investment Increase in output; reductions in
imports and cross-border transport
(+) (+) (-)
•  Import substitution Increase in output; reductions in
imports and cross-border transport
(+) (+) (-)
•  Substitution of
domestic production
Shift in output (0) (+,-) (+,-)
•  Change in
competitiveness
Increase/no change in output for
export; increase/no change in cross-
border transport
(+,0) (+,0) (+,0)
Source:  Sprenger, Rolf-Ulrich "Globalization, Employment and Environment" OECD Proceedings,
OECD Paris 1997.29
In recognition of the growing importance of foreign direct investment, OECD has
attempted to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) among its members and
non-members willing and able to meet is obligations.  (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, and
Slovak Republic joined the negotiations as observers.)  MAI attempts to establish rules of
investment and to create an inclusive investment climate, analogous to what has been negotiated
and agreed upon for trade and services through GATT and GATS.  The main objectives of a
multilateral agreement on investment are to meet the foreign investors' need for (a) long-term
stability of rules and procedures, (b) open markets and equal competitive opportunities with
domestic investors, (c) protection of existing investments and (d) an international mechanism for
settling disputes with national governments.  OECD took the initiative of drafting MAI in
recognition of (1) its major stake in investment rules, as it accounts for 85 percent of FDI
outflows and 60 percent of inflows; (2) the common view of the benefits from free investment
flows; and (3) its need for more comprehensive and effective rules.  MAI was intended to
include direct investments, portfolio investment, real estate investments and rights under
contract.  The main provisions of MAI were:
•  Non-discrimination: foreign investors must be treated no less favorably than domestic
investors (National Treatment) and all investors should be accorded the Most-
Favored-Nation Treatment.
•  Transparency of laws, regulations and procedures
•  Free transfer of funds to and from the host country
•  Expropriation only for public purpose and with full compensation
•  Dispute resolution through binding arbitration.
General exceptions were allowed for national security, and integrity and stability of the financial
system; temporary safeguards in response to balance of payments crisis; and country specific
exceptions and regulations as negotiated among the parties.  Exceptions for culture were also
considered.
With regard to the environment, MAI allowed freedom to governments to implement
policies to protect the environment as long as these policies are not more stringent for foreign
investors than for domestic ones, and MAI parties do not lower their environmental standards to
attract foreign investment.  The NAFTA provisions against environmental measures that
constitute disguised restrictions on trade and investment were in effect expanded to include all
OECD countries under MAI.
MAI has been heavily criticized on a variety of fronts, from national sovereignty and
cultural protection to public health and the environment.  The environmental criticism included
among others:  (1) concerns that corporate challenges to environmental regulations will
accelerate; (2) the intellectual property rights provisions giving patents full protection may
conflict with provisions of the biodiversity convention; (3) while logging concessions are
protected by MAI, acquiring land for preservation is not protected; and (4) governments are
unduly constrained by provisions on rights from concessions, licenses, and permits in regulating
corporations developing natural resources in their jurisdictions (Clarke 1998).30
At the end, MAI did not receive the necessary support from key parties to come into
effect.  However, new efforts to negotiate a multinational agreement on investment are
anticipated in coming years.
Globalization, Technology and Environment
3
Economic globalization affects both the nature and the rate of technological innovation
and diffusion through a variety of channels:  (a) more liberalized international trade, (b) more
liberalized capital flows and a more favorable investment climate, (c) improved institutional and
communication links, and (d) increased protection of intellectual property rights.
As we have already seen, 75 percent of international technology transfer arises from trade
flows and 18 percent from investment flows (OECD 1995).  Technology transfer arises from the
trade of both goods and services including licensing of particular technologies through arms-
length transaction with foreign firms.  Expanded trade also advances the rate of technological
innovations by (a) enlarging the size of the market and generating economies of scale, (b) by
realizing more monopoly profits from successful innovation and (c) by reducing dislocation of
R&D efforts as protectionist barriers are removed.  Capital flows, especially FDI, contribute to
technological innovations and diffusion by (a) generating greater finance from capital exporting
countries for financing investments in equipment, embodying more advanced technologies that
are available in the host country, (b) by investing in R&D overseas, and (c) by generating
technological spillover to national firms, through imitation, employment turnover, and by
supplying multinationals demanding higher quality standards.  For at least two reasons, the
technology transfer by multinationals tends to be more advanced than what already exists in the
host country:  (a) 80 percent of FDI originates in countries that are primary sources of
technological innovations such as the US, UK, Germany and Japan; (b) in order to overcome
institutional, regulatory, cultural, and other hurdles in the host country, multinationals tend to
apply advanced technology which, along with management, tend to be their most important
competitive advantages (Grossman and Helpman 1995).  It is estimated that 75 percent of
industrial R&D is done by multinationals.  Finally, the flow of technical expertise between
countries encouraged by globalization results in international exchange of information which
reduces the costs of developing new technologies.  Archibugi and Michie (1995) report that 75
percent of patent applications in OECD countries come from outside OECD.  However, again it
is the middle-income and newly industrializing economies that have benefited most from the
international flow of technology and knowledge.  This creates a new source of inequality among
developing countries as some converge technologically while others are left further behind.
Having established the link between globalization and technological innovation and
transfer, there remains to establish the link between technological change on the one hand and
environmental quality and resource use on the other.  What has been the environmental intensity
of technological change?  Table 10 indicates that the material intensity of output in all regions of
the world was reduced during the period 1970-1988.  This includes most basic material inputs
such as wood, metals, minerals, steel and raw agricultural materials:  while world GDP during
1970-1991 increased by only 38 percent (Young and Sachs 1995) and CO2 dioxide emissions
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(WRI 1996) per unit of GDP also declined.  This decline, or course, is only in part due to
technological change; and in part to structural change.  Furthermore, the aggregate resource use
and pollution levels continue to rise as the scale effect of global output growth outweighs the
structural and technological change effects.
Table 10.  Technological Innovation with Significant Environmental Impact





















































Source:  Johnstone, N.  "Globalization, Technology, and Environment"  OECD, 1997
Is there a trend for technological innovations to be less environment-intensive or cleaner?
Environmental intensity changes when there is a change in the product or the production process,
when one input is substituted for another and when the technology is used more efficiently.
There is no comprehensive analysis of recent technologies as to their environmental intensity.
Table 11 presents a list of selected technological innovations with significant (positive)
environmental impacts, which have been widely adopted in recent years and are spreading
throughout the developing world.  (For a discussion of the determinants of the environment-
intensity of technology, see section on technology effects of trade liberalization.)32
Table 11.  Average annual rate of change in material-intensity of output, by region
1970-1973 1974-1983 1984-1988
OECD (except USA
Raw Agricultural Materials -3.39 -3.88 0.42
Wood -1.9 -1.4 -0.17
Metals & Minerals -0.38 -2.22 -1.66
Steel -3.87 -2.09 -3.6
NADCs
Raw Agricultural Materials -1.99 -2.01 2.58
Wood -3.37 -0.96 -2.28
Metals & Minerals 12.48 2.82 1.14
Steel -5.29 -3.39 -3.86
USA
Raw Agricultural Materials 1.73 -3.86 4.08
Wood -2.73 0.24 -1.07
Metals & Minerals 10.03 2.36 2.87
Steel -5.12 -3.12 -2.63
Asia
Raw Agricultural Materials -3.26 -1.29 1.47
Wood -3.79 -1.52 -3.18
Metals & Minerals 11.19 3.67 0.02
Steel -5.45 -3.52 -4.79
NADCs = Non-Asian Developing Countries
Source:  Hoffman and Zivkovic, 1992.
In conclusion, globalization in principle could improve the environmental characteristics
of technology through (a) increased exposure to foreign markets from where cleaner
technologies and more effective pollution abatement equipment than those available at home can
be imported; (b) increased access to export markets that may be more environmentally
demanding than local markets; (c) foreign investment that brings with it the technologies and
practices of the home country with more stringent environmental standards than the host country;
(d) increased diffusion of the fast-growing export-oriented environmental goods and services
industry.  However, empirical evidence on the quantitative effect of globalization-driven
technological innovation and diffusion, especially on developing countries, is extremely limited.
Intellectual Property Rights
One of the Uruguay Round results that liberalized trade and created the WTO was the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, known as the TRIPS Agreement, which came into force with WTO on33
January 1, 1995.  The TRIPS Agreement sets up the rules that WTO members must follow in
establishing a system to protect intellectual property rights within their borders.  Unlike other
WTO rules that describe what countries may not do, TRIPS prescribes what countries must do.
For example, it requires that any intellectual property rights granted to domestic innovators must
also be granted to foreign innovators (national treatment) and no party should be favored over
others (non-discrimination).  Contravening the TRIPS Agreement may bring "cross-retaliation"
through goods covered by other agreements.  Developing country members and economies in
transition have five years and less-developed countries ten years to set up the required laws and
meet the standards set up in the TRIPS agreement.  This is a challenge for countries that have no
related legislation in place or have entire sectors developed based on imitations of innovations
developed elsewhere (e.g. India's pharmaceutical industry).
It is certain that complying with TRIPS will impose significant social and financial costs
on countries through higher prices (due to payment of royalties and industry concentration).  For
example, small-scale seed and pharmaceutical companies in India and other developing countries
are likely to go out of business and prices will rise beyond the reach of many poor people.
TRIPS also is likely to have significant but not easily predictable effects on the
environment.  For example, concentration of the seed market in the hands of a few major
producers who specialize in a few strains may result in loss of biodiversity and impoverishment
of the genetic pool.  The process of loss of thousands of land races that began with the Green
Revolution would accelerate.  A narrow genetic base and extensive monocultures will be more
vulnerable to pests and blight epidemics.
A related effect arises from the different treatment of formal and informal innovation.
While varieties resulting from formal innovation resulting from scientific research by firms or
individuals is protected under TRIPS, no protection is rendered to varieties produced informally
by farmers by selecting the desired characteristics through traditional knowledge. This pits
breeders' rights against farmers' rights and is criticized as unfair, especially since breeders and
other formal innovators search for new crop traits and medicines by studying the products in use
by traditional societies.  As traditional medicines and land races developed over many
generations do not fit the standard model of innovation, they are not protected by TRIPS, with
the consequence that a steady flow of information from South to North worth billions goes
uncompensated (Runnalls 1998).
Another concern relates not just to cultivated crops but to biodiversity in general.  The
release of new life forms, such as genetically modified plants, animals and microorganisms,
protected by TRIPS, raises concerns relating to the ability of such "new life forms' to multiply,
mutate and migrate.  Genetically modified organisms (GMO), once they have been released into
the environment, may multiply and spread widely, affecting existing species.  Even harmless
GMOs without side effects may eventually mutate and assume unintended qualities or migrate to
other organisms through pollination or sexual reproduction.  Because of these concerns, the
TRIPS Agreement allows for exceptions to patenting animals and plants, but the fact that
countries can choose to patent life forms is considered contrary to the Precautionary Principle
which is fundamental to sustainable development.  These threats to biodiversity are expected to34
be addressed in the Biodiversity Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity now under
negotiation.
Globalization and Environmental Policy and Performance
Economic globalization changes the "balance of power" between markets, national
governments and international collective action.  It enhances the influence of markets on
economic, social, and environmental outcomes and reduces the degree of freedom and unilateral
management capabilities of national governments, and it creates the necessity for states to
cooperate both in the management of the global commons and the coordination of domestic
policies (Zarsky 1997).  Globalization creates market driven political pressures to gain or
maintain competitiveness and this forces premature and not necessarily appropriate convergence
of environmental policy.  In the presence of diversity of environmental endowments, assimilative
capacities and preferences efficient environmental management requires sensitivity to local
ecological and social conditions.  Diversity of conditions calls for a diversity of policies.  Yet
globalization leads to uniformity and inertia in environmental policy in the absence of collective
action.
The main channel through which globalization influences environmental policy is
through the cost of production.  To the extent that environmental policy raises or is perceived to
raise the cost of production, globalization-inspired concerns about gaining or maintaining
competitiveness, mitigate against any change of policy, that might change the cost parameters
unless competitors are subject to the same policy.  The creates the inertia, pressures toward
uniformity and a shift of power from national governments to market and global governance.
Zarsky (1997) advanced the hypothesis that globalization creates forces that:  (a) lead to
domestic environmental "policy paralysis" and (b) puts the market in the driver's seat with regard
to environmental policy and performance.  On the one hand, diverse or weaker environmental
policies raise concerns among competitors that the country is somehow trying to subsidize
exports to attract foreign investors at their expense.  On the other hand, any attempt to raise
environmental standards raise concerns among domestic producers about higher costs of
production and loss of competitiveness and hence loss of market share and foreign investment to
competitors.  Between the concerns of domestic producers and those of foreign competitors,
environmental policy makers have a very narrow room to maneuver.  This room has narrowed
further as profit margins became smaller and smaller under the competitive pressures of
globalization.  Even if the increase in production costs is negligible and temporary, the fear or
threat of being priced out of the market or lose a hard-won export market or foreign investment
leads to "policy paralysis" and a strong bias towards the status quo.  But the status quo does not
favor the environment, since "relative market prices and patterns of competitive advantage
usually grow out of an institutional context in which environment is left out of the equation.  The
pressures of globalization mean that improvements in environmental performance will be slow.
Given the large new demands on global ecosystems posed by rapid economic growth in
developing countries, slow progress—even if steady—points toward a pessimistic assessment of
the prospects for global sustainability" (Zarsky 1997, p. 32).35
The pressures to maintain the status quo or make only small gradual changes in step with
competitors is not a temporary phenomenon but one that gathers momentum over time:  as the
share of income denied from trade and foreign investment rises, the  political pressures and
lobbying not to disturb competitiveness intensify.
This "Zarsky hypothesis" leads to a number of testable predictions.  First globalization
generated pressures to maintain competitiveness keep governments and enterprises from taking
any initiatives to improve their environmental performance, if they entail significant costs on
domestic producers.  Second, developing country product standards will be slowly pulled up
towards those of large markets and PPMs towards those of main competitors.  Third, the
benchmark-setting developed country standards will improve only slowly and gradually out of
fear of loss of competitiveness to slowly converging developing countries.
There has been no direct test of the Zarsky hypothesis and its predictions, Zarsky presents
some indirect evidence that tends to support the hypothesis, at least in part:
•  The proposed BTU tax in the US in 1993 was defeated on account of its perceived threat
to US industry's international competitiveness despite the fact that (a) US energy prices
are about one-half of those of the rest of OECD; (b) the estimated impact on even the
energy intensive industries (aluminum, chemicals, fertilizers) was negligible (1-2 percent
of the value of shipments); and (c) the economic and environmental benefits were
assessed to be substantial in terms of deficit reduction, improved energy efficiency,
decreased pollution and reduced dependence on foreign oil.
•  The proposed EU-wide carbon/energy tax in the early 1990s was postponed indefinitely
on the grounds that Japan, the US and other EU trading partners were not prepared to
adopt similar measures.  A similar greenhouse levy of on only $3 per ton of carbon was
defeated in Australia in 1994 despite the exemption for transport fees and fossil fuel
exports, and the estimated negligible impact on the other energy-intensive industries such
as aluminum.  The industry's contention that the perceived effects, however small, could
drive investment away towards low-energy-cost countries carried the day.
•  China, India, and many other developing and transitional economies which continue to
subsidize fossil fuels and electricity to the order of 30-50 percent of the world prices are
reluctant to remove these subsidies from fear of loss of competitiveness, despite the
disappearance of the original rationale of these subsidies—the promotion of state-owned
internal oriented industrial growth.
The implication of the Zarsky hypothesis is that nation-states face a prisoners dilemma
with regard to environmental policy:  pressures to compete for market and investments in a
global economy compel them to pursue individual policies that result in lower pay-off than if
they acted collectively.  Cooperation and coordination of policy in internalizing environmental
cost while recognizing the need for diversity would result in greater welfare for all countries.
The absence of effective global governance or enforceable coordination condemns countries to a
collectively suboptimal policy of premature and inefficient convergence to slowly improving
environmental standards.36
Yet there are counter-threads that tend to improve environmental performance even as
environmental policy is caught in classic prisoners dilemma.  Growing public environmental
awareness and rapidly spreading information about industry's environmental performance, both
spearheaded by the information technology, give rise to a global environmental ethic.  Under
pressure from communities, customer, shareholders and employees, industry self-regulation is
advancing ahead of formal regulations.  Furthermore, the pressures of competition compel firms
to intensify their search for more efficient, resource-saving, waste-reducing technologies.
Moreover, the cross-border flows of capital, commodities, people and ideas promote
technological and managerial change—resources are better allocated, cleaner and more efficient
technologies are disseminated and the environmental standards of worst performers are gradually
pulled up.  These trends are fully consistent with the Zarsky hypothesis that globalization makes
markets, the drivers of environmental performance, at the same time as it tends to "paralyze"
official environmental policy.
Managing the Process of Globalization to Protect the Environment and
Enhance Sustainability
Countries and people have the potential to drive significant benefits from the
globalization process but there is still the problem of realizing this potential.  Too much attention
has been paid to the economic benefits of globalization and not enough to the social and
environmental implications.  As a result, the promise and potential of globalization as a force of
sustainable human development may not be realized.  Furthermore, at the same time that
globalization improves the prospects for economic growth worldwide, it may reduce the
economic prospects in individual countries, sectors and communities.  A variety of factors
contribute to wide disparities both within nations and between nations:
•  Lack of access to more efficient technologies
•  Lack of access to capital
•  Inadequate flexibility to respond to changes in market demand
•  Inability to manage structural change
•  Weak institutions and absence of effective safety nets.
To the extent that globalization marginalizes economies, sectors, and people, it results in
poverty-induced resource depletion and environmental degradation, which lead to further human
deprivation, disparity and dispowerment.
Globalization is likely to place significant stresses on the environment if perverse
subsidies and other distortions are not removed and environmental costs fully internalized or if
“social adjustment” policies are not in place to cushion economic dislocation and avert
marginalization of the poor.  Globalization, by driving a wedge between what is produced and
what is consumed in any given locations, alters the distribution of environmental impacts and the
costs of avoiding them within the current generation and between the current and future
generations.
The environmental consequences of globalization differ from the economic effects both
in time and space: (1) environmental impacts are more long-term, dynamic and cumulative and
they are beset with uncertainty; we don’t really know what the long-term damages are; and (2)37
environmental impacts involve both physical and non-physical spillovers that may or may not be
transmitted through markets such as cross-border pollution, aesthetics, ethical or moral concerns
of parties not involved in the transaction.  Globalization generates international interest in what
traditionally were considered purely domestic policies, since economic integration implies that
trade and investment are now being affected by such policies.  Globalization increasingly brings
into conflict notions of national sovereignty over production processes with globally-oriented
life-cycle perspectives, where consumers want to know the overall environmental impact of what
they buy and consume.
In conclusion globalization brings with it potentially large benefits as well as risks.  The
challenge is to manage the process of globalization in such a way that it promotes environmental
sustainability and equitable human development.  The ability of nation-states to manage risks,
inequalities and change is severely restricted by taxation constraints and the need to remain
competitive.  Hence, the traditional instruments of trade barriers and command and control
regulations would not work because they would have unacceptably high costs in a globalized
world and at the same time be less effective.  To manage globalization in the interest of both
people and the environment, it would be necessary to implement more efficient and innovative
policies domestically and more effective global governance internationally.
National Policies
1.  Accelerate democratization and institutional development to keep in pace with globalization
2.  Increase accountability and transparency throughout the economy, and especially in the
formulation and implementation of public policy
3.  Channel more public investment to human capability formation
4.  Preserve as much as possible of the autonomy of the state to exercise fiscal and monetary
policies to achieve both macroeconomic stability and growth
5.  Reform domestic policies that both distort trade and have negative environmental impacts
(e.g. energy subsidies)
6.  Correct existing market failures though efficient incentive systems (economic instruments)
that internalize environmental costs, to avert their magnification by trade liberalization and
economic integration.
7.  Improve the effectiveness of environmental policy (benefit per dollar spent) through the
involvement of businesses and local communities in monitoring and enforcement rather than
relying on the state’s limited budget and weak regulatory enforcement capacity.  Instruments
of empowerment include information disclosure in environmental performance of firms, and
provision of training and other capacity building services to communities.
8.  Institute social adjustment policies to cushion economic dislocation and avert the
marginalization of the poor.
It must be recognized, however, that the autonomy of the state to act deliberately to
protect the environment or to cushion the impact on the poor of structural or other changes
brought about by globalization is limited by the need to compete in the global economy for
capital, jobs and markets, on the one hand, and by the interest that competitors and trade partners
take on the country’s  domestic environmental and social policies, on the other.  Countries facing38
financial crisis are further constrained by limitations imposed on their fiscal and monetary policy
by creditors, the International Monetary Fund and the crisis itself.
International Policies
As we have seen, globalization constrains the state’s unilateral management capacities
and creates new imperatives for states to coordinate their domestic environmental policies as
well as to cooperate in the management of the global commons.  Without effective global
governance (or effective multilateralism as Zarsky calls it) nation-states, subject to the pressures
of globalization, drift towards a low-level environmental policy convergence that is insensitive to
local ecological conditions and does not respect the diversity of preferences and priorities across
and within nations.  The challenge is to mobilize collective action among governments, firms and
civil societies to overcome the gravity towards the sterile uniformity and inertia created by
narrow competitiveness concerns and create a broader environmental policy framework, which
will (a) recognize and allow for the diversity of environmental endowments and preferences; (b)
raise the terms of environmental policy convergence; and (c) allow for continuous improvement
in environmental performance.  In such a framework policy coordination, harmonization and
convergence would not be understood as homogenization or standardization of the objectives and
instruments of environmental policy regardless of local circumstances, but a collective move
towards sustainable development at different speeds depending on stage of development,
environmental endowments, etc.
Unfortunately, the one international “body” entrusted with the responsibility of building a
bridge between environmental and trade policy, WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment
(CTE), did not focus on finding “a synergy between environment and trade as two equal policy
objectives.   Rather they have explored how to fit environmental concerns within the framework
of existing trade regimes” (Ewing and Taresofsky, 1996).  CTE saw its role as one of limiting
unilateral state actions in the name of environmental protection in order to protect the trading
system rather than one of a paradigm shift from a negative to a positive trade-environment
relationship and a “collective responsibility to promote sustainable trade, investment and growth
(Zarsky 1991).  Rather than focusing on how trade rules can promote sustainable development
CTE focussed narrowly on (a) whether there should be a “safe harbor” within WTO for trade-
restricting measures included in multilateral environmental agreements (MEA); and (b) on
whether eco-labelling schemes constitute non-tariff trade barriers.  These issues are important as
guidelines are urgently needed for both ecolabelling schemes and MEA negotiators but they
cannot be resolved in isolation from other important issues in the interface of trade and
environment and without an overarching framework of sustainable development in which both
environment and trade are critically important and synergistic.  As Zarsky (1997) put it, “first,
the Organization [WTO] as a whole needs to affirm its commitment to a development
agenda…Among other things, this would entail abandoning the idea that the primary goal of
trade-environment diplomacy is to enhance the capacities of developed countries to restrict
market access on environmental grounds (p. 41).”
Other unresolved issues besides MEA’s and ecolabelling, central to the trade-
environment relationship are: (1) non-product-related process and production methods (PPMs)
for which WTO rules have come increasingly in conflict with globally-oriented product life-39
cycle perspectives; and (2) the gradual removal of domestic policies such as energy, chemical
and water subsidies that both distort trade and damage the environment; and (3) internalization of
environmental costs.
The latter two issues, while domestic in nature and unilaterally beneficial are politically
unpalatable because of concerns about loss of competitiveness, not unlike the concerns that
limited unilateral trade liberalization and necessitated several rounds of trade negotiations and
coordinated action, which culminated with the Uruguay Round.  What is needed is a “Green
Round” to coordinate joint action on the elimination of environmentally damaging subsidies and
internationalization of environmental costs (with due recognition of diversity among countries).
The question is whether WTO is up to the task of convening such a “Green Round” and
coordinating the implementation of multilateral agreements on resource subsidies and
internalization of environmental costs.  WTO has thus far provided no evidence that is either
prepared to view the trade-environment-relationship in a broader development context, or willing
to address it in a more holistic manner.
A “Global Environment Organization” as called by Esty (1994) may be necessary to fill
the gap which in its absence is now partially filled by regional groupings such as NAFTA,
APEC, OECD and other, which attempt policy coordination among their members.  That such
regional initiatives are not a substitute for effective global governance and multilateralism can be
seen from the now defunct efforts of OECD to negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI) among is members.  First, its main motivation was to promote foreign investor interests
by reducing political risk and ensuring “national treatment” rather than to encourage investment
for good environmental management and sustainable development.  Second, it was met with
suspicion by developing countries which viewed it as a run around WTO to conclude an
agreement without their participation which, in letter, would bind only OECD members but in
effect would apply to them as well.  This gave rise to calls for exceptions to MAI provisions to
protect the environment and ultimately for a much broader sustainable development investment
agreement.  Belated offers by OECD negotiators to include a “pollution haven” clause and to
append environmental guidelines for multinationals did not constitute substitutes for effective
policy coordination.
Clearly, private capital flows into developing countries, especially emerging markets,
will continue to grow rapidly into the foreseeable future.  The challenge is to attract more foreign
investment into the poorer countries and to direct it to sustainable development activities.  In this
regards, Official Development Assistance (ODA) has a critical role to play in leveraging private
capital flows, both directly and through encouragement of better policies (including prudent
macroeconomic policies and outward-oriented trade policies) in the recipient countries.
Governments can ensure through regulations, incentives, and voluntary agreements that new
investment is directed towards sustainable goals or, at a minimum, it does not jeopardize
environmental, social and long-term development goals.
At the multilateral level, there has been a clear trend since the early 1990s to take into
account more consistently the environmental and social effects of projects.  This is true of both
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) which guarantees funds to governments
and the private sector to reduce risks, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) that40
provides loans, equity and other financial instruments to private sector in development.  In
cooperation with national governments, international organizations should support the
monitoring and the development of a database for tracking the environmental impacts of foreign
capital flows on environmental quality and sustainability.
With regard to technology, globalization can play a key role in generating and diffusing
resource-saving and cleaner production technologies to developing countries but, for this to
happen, several policy concerns must be resolved.  First, the fact that developed countries
dominate the generation of technological innovations, means that some of these technologies and
their environmental features are ill-suited to the factor endowments, and economic and
environmental  circumstances of developing countries.  Second, developing countries may lack
the capacity to successfully absorb technological innovations, including those that aim to
mitigate negative environmental impacts.  It is, therefore, important that developing countries
themselves develop their own institutional framework and capacity for adoption and adaptation
of foreign technologies as well as for domestic generation of innovations (Johnstone 1997).
Some domestic and foreign technological capacities tend to be complimentary than substitutable,
domestic capacity should be coupled with removal of domestic barriers to diffusion of foreign
technology, such as import tariffs on capital equipment, local content requirements, or foreign
exchange restrictions.  Lack of protection of intellectual property rights is another barrier to
diffusion, since foreign firms may be concerned that transferring or licensing a technology may
result in their losing their market advantage.  Developing countries should undertake to increase
their own capacity to assimilate transferred technology by fostering research and development,
and improving their skills in negotiation and management with the aim to strengthen their
intellectual property rights.
International policies also have an important bearing on technology transfer.  While
MEAs such as the Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention provide for transfer of best
available, environmentally safe technologies to developing countries, care must be taken so that
the transferred technology reflects the economic and environmental conditions of the recipient
country rather than those of the donor (Johnstone 1997).  For this to happen, it is necessary to
develop cooperation between donors and recipient in R & D related to environmental
technologies.  Tropical environments and materials differ fundamentally from temperate ones in
ways that affect the effectiveness and efficiency of environmental technologies designed for
temperate environments.
Finally, there is scope for governments to ease the terms of access to some cleaner
production technologies for developing countries as a form of development assistance.
Technologies, such as newly developed vaccines or clean coal technologies which benefit
diversity, the environment and human health, could be made freely available to developing
countries.  Developed countries can soften the impacts of TRIPs on developing countries by
specifying very liberal terms of protection for environmental and clean production innovations
involving public financing.
There is a need for an Amendment or Understanding among WTO members that the
rights of informal innovators are also protected and for a broader interpretation of TRIPs to
include patents for land races and other products of traditional knowledge in exchange for a41
commitment by the developing countries to preserve these varieties.  There are many innovative
ideas including granting of special status, such as free or concessional access or royalty sharing,
to source communities for commercial products "derived" from traditional knowledge or
products in traditional use.  The Convention on Biological Diversity already provides that the
benefits from commercial use of genetic resources should be shared with the country of origin in
a "fair and equitable way."
Finally, with regard to the risks posed to the biodiversity of flora and fauna, any patent
protection afforded to the genetically modified organisms under TRIPs must incorporate the
highest standards of protection according to the "precautionary principle," which is fundamental
to sustainable development.
In conclusion, the more integrated environmental and trade policies are, the more
sustainable economic growth will be and the more globalization can be harnessed for the benefit
of the environment.  At a rather modest level, this integration may take the form of
institutionalization of environmental issues in future bilateral, multilateral and regional trade
agreements.  At a more ambitious level, new institutions of more effective and equitable global
governance can be created to bring together governments, the private sector and civil society in a
dialogue to achieve consensus for action in dealing with globalization-induced volatility,
inequality and threats to environmental sustainability.42
APPENDIX
Table A.1: Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements with Possible Trade Impacts
Major Global Environmental
Agreements with Major Trade
Impacts
Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, 29
December 1972
Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species, 3
March 1973
Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer,
22 March 1985
Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16
September 1987
Basel Convention on the Control
of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, 22 March 1989
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change,
9 May 1992
Convention on Biological




Treaty for the Preservation and
Protection of Fur Seals, 7 July 1911
ILO Convention (#13) concern-
ing the Use of White Lead in
Painting, 25 October 1921
FAO Agreement for the
Establishment of the Indo-
Pacific Fisheries Commission,
26 February 1948 (amended and
super-seded 20 January 1961)
Washington International
Convention for the North-West
Atlantic Fisheries, 8 February
1949
Washington Convention for the
Establishment of an Inter-
American Tropical Tuna
Commission, 31 May 1949
Paris International Convention






for the High Seas Fisheries of the
North Pacific Ocean, 9 May
1952
Washington International
Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling and 1956 Protocol,
10 November 1948; Protocol, 4
May 1959
Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, 29
April 1958
London North-East Atlantic
Fisheries Convention, 24 January
1959
Varna Convention concern-ing
Fishing in the Black Sea (as
amended 30 June 1965), 7 July
1959
Paris International Convention
on the Protection of New Varie-
ties of Plants, 2 December 1961
Rio de Janeiro International
Convention for the Conservation
of Atlantic Tunas, 14 May 1966
Phyto-sanitary Convention for
Africa South of the Sahara, 13
September 1968
FAO Convention on the
Conservation of the Living
Resources of the South-East
Atlantic, 23 October 1969
Canberra Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources, 20
May 1980
International Tropical Timber
Agreement, 18 November 1983
Reykjavik Convention for the
Conservation of Salmon in the
North Atlantic Ocean
Pacific Islands Regional
Fisheries Treaty, 2 April 1987
Convention for the Establish-
ment of a Latin American Tuna
Organization, 1989
Wellington Convention on the
Prohibition of Driftnet Fishing in
the South Pacific, 24 November
198943
Table A.1: Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements with Possible Trade Impacts (cont’d)
Other Global Environmental
Agreements
Paris International Convention for
the Protection of Birds, 18 October
1950
International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, 12 May 1954
Brussels International Convention
relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties, 29 November 1969
Brussels International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 29 November 1969
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance, Especially
as Waterfowl Habitat, 2 February
1971
World Heritage
Bonn Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species
of Wild Animals, 23 June 1979
Convention on Desertification
Other Multilateral Environmental
Agreements with Trade Impacts
European Convention for the
Protection of Animals During
International Transport, 13
December 1968
Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, 29
December 1972
Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species, 3 March 1973
London International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL), 2 November 1973
European Convention for the
Protection of Animals kept
for Farming Purposes, 10
March 1976
Bonn Convention for the
Protection of the Rhine River
against Pollution by
Chlorides, 3 December 1976
European Convention for the
Protection of Animals for
Slaughter, 10 May 1979
European Convention for the
Protection of Animals Used
for Experimental and Other
Scientific Purposes, 18 March
1986
European Convention for the
Protection of Pet Animals, 13
November 1987
Bamako Convention on the
Ban of Import into Africa and
the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management
of Hazardous Wastes within
Africa, 30 January 1991
Other Multilateral
Environmental Agreements
London Convention for the
Protection of Wild Animals,




Wildlife Preservation in the
Western Hemisphere, 12
October 1940
Berne Convention on the
International Commission for the
Protection of the Rhine against
Pollution, 29 April 1963
Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping
from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo
Convention), 15 February 1972
Helsinki Convention for the
Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area, 22 March 1974
Paris Convention for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution
from Land-Based Sources, 4
June 1974
Barcelona Convention for the
Protection of the Mediterranean
Sea against Pollution, 16
February 1976
Apia Convention on the
Conservation of Nature in the
South Pacific, 12 June 1976
Kuwait Regional
Convention for Co-opera-tion on
the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, 24
April 1978
ECE Convention on Long Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, 13
November 1979
Abidjan Convention for Co-
operation in the Protection and
Development of the Marine and
Coastal Environment of the West
and Central African Region, 23
March 198144
Table A.1: Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements with Possible Trade Impacts (cont’d)
Other Global Environmental
Agreements (cont'd)
Lima Convention for the
Protection of the Marine
Environment and Coastal Area
of the South-East Pacific, 12
November 1981
Jeddah Regional Convention for
the Conservation of the Red Sea
and Gulf of Aden Environment,
14 February 1982
Cartagena Convention for the
Protection and Development of
the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, 24
March 1983
Nairobi Convention for the
Protection, Management and
Development of the Marine and
Coastal Environment of the
Eastern African Region, 21 June
1985
Noumea Convention for the
Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of







Source:  von Moltke, Konrad.  "International Environmental Management, Trade Regimes and
Sustainability."  Paper prepared for the International Institute for Sustainable Development
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, January 199645
References
Adams, J. (1997).  "Globalisation, trade, and environment."  Globalization and Environment,
OECD Proceedings, OECD: Paris.
Alexander Grant and Company. Various years.  Annual Study of General Manufacturing
Climates of the Forty-Eight Contiguous States of America. Alexander Grant and Company:
Chicago.
Anderson, K. (1992).  “Agricultural trade liberalization and the environment: A global
perspective,” The World Economy 15(1): 153-71, January.
Anderson, K. and A. Strutt (1994). “On measuring the environmental impacts of agricultural
trade liberalization,” Center for International Economic Studies, Seminar paper 94-06,
University of Adelaide: Adelaide.
Archibugi, D. and J. Michie (1995).  "The globalisation of technology: A new taxonomy,"
Cambridge Journal of Economics 19:121-140.
Bhagwati, J. and T.N. Srinivasan (1997). "Trade and the environment: Does environmental
diversity detract from the case for free trade?" in Bhagwati, J. and Hudec, R., (eds), Fair
Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. 1: Economic Analysis MIT
Press: Cambridge, MA.
Clarke, T. (1998).  “MAI-Day! The Corporate Rule Treaty: The Multilateral Agreement on
Investments (MAI) seeks to consolidate global corporate rule,”
http://www.nassist.com/mai/mai(2)x.html.
Epping, M. (1986). "Tradition in transition: The emergence of new categories in plant location,"
Arkansas Business and Economic Review, 19(3):16-25.
Esty, D.C. (1994). Greening the GATT, Trade, Environment, and the Future, Institute for
International Economics: Washington, DC.
Ewing, K.P. and R.G. Taresofsky, (1996).  The "Trade and Environment" Agenda:  Survey of
Major Issues and Proposals form Marakesh to Singapore. IUCN Environmental Law Centre,
Bonn, December.
Gentry, B.S. et al (1996). Private Capital Flows and the Environment:  Lessons from Latin
America. Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (draft report).
Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman (1995).  "Technology and trade."  CEPR Discussion Paper
1134: London.
Grossman, G.M. and A.B. Krueger (1993). "Environmental impacts of a North American Free
Trade Agreement." In P. Garber (ed.) The US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement. MIT Press:
Cambridge, MA, 13-56.46
Grossman, G.M. and A. Krueger (1995).  "Economic growth and the environment," Quarterly
Journal of Economics  110(2): 353-77, May.
Henriques, I. and P. Sadorsky (1996).  "The determinants of an environmentally responsive firm:
An empirical approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30: 381-95.
Hoffman, U. and D. Zivkovic (1992).  "Demand growth for industrial raw materials and its
determinants:  An analysis for the period 1965-1988."  UNCTAD Discussion Paper No. 5:
Geneva.
Johnstone, N. (1997) "Globalization, technology, and environment." Globalization and
Environment, OECD Proceedings, OECD: Paris.
Levinson, A. (1997). "Environmental regulations and industry location:  International and
domestic evidence," in in Bhagwati, J. and Hudec, R., (eds), Fair Trade and Harmonization:
Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. 1: Economic Analysis MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Low, P. (ed.) (1992).  "Trade and the environment:  A survey of the literature,", in Low, P. (ed.)
International Trade and the Environment.  World Bank Discussion paper 159, The World
Bank: Washington DC.
Low, P. and A. Yeats (1992)., "Do 'dirty' industries migrate?" in Low, P. (ed.) International
Trade and the Environment.  World Bank Discussion paper 159, The World Bank:
Washington DC.
Lucas, R., P. Wheeler and H. Hettige (1992).  "Economic development, environmental regulation
and international migration of toxic pollution 1960-1988,: in Low, P. (ed.) International
Trade and the Environment.  World Bank Discussion paper 159, The World Bank:
Washington DC.
Lyne, J. (1990).  "Service taxes, international site selection and the 'green' movement dominate
executives' political focus." Site Selection, October.
Nentjes, A. and D. Wiersma (1987).  "Innovation and pollution control,"  International Journal
of Social Economics, 17(4): 247-65.
OECD (1995). Foreign direct Investment, Trade and Employment. OECD: Paris.
OECD (1996). Globalizaiton of Industry: Overview and Sector Reports.  OECD: Paris.
OECD (1994a). The Environmental Effects of Trade, OECD: Paris.
OECD (1997). Globalization and Environment, OECD Proceedings, OECD: Paris.
Panayotou, T. (1997). "Demystifying the Environmental Kuznets Curve: Turning a Black Box
into a Policy Tool." Environmental and Development Economics, 2(4): 465-484.47
Panayotou, T. (1997). “Taking stock of trends in sustainable development since Rio.” In Finance
for Sustainable Development: The Road Ahead: Proceedings of the Fourth Group Meeting
on Financial Issues of Agenda 21, pp. 35-72, Santiago, Chile. United Nations, New York.
Panayotou, T. and J.R. Vincent. (1997). “Environmental regulation and competitiveness.”
Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum: Geneva.
Panayotou, T., T. Schatzki and Q. Limvorapitak. (1997). “Differential Industry Response to
Formal and Informal Environmental Regulations in Newly Industrializing Economies: The
Case of Thailand.” A Case Study for the HIID Asia Environmental Economics Policy
Seminar.
Pargal, S. and D. Wheeler (1995).  "Informal regulation of industrial pollution in developing
countries."  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1416.  World Bank: Washington,
DC.
Repetto, R. (1993). Trade and Environment Policies:  Achieving Complemntarities and Avoiding
Conflicts, World Resources Institute: Washington, DC.
Repetto, R. (1995). Jobs, Competitiveness, and Environmental Regulation:  What are the Real
Issues? World Research Institute: Washington, DC, March.
Robison, H.D. (1988).  "Industrial pollution abatement:  The impact on the balance of trade."
Canadian Journal of Economics 21(1).
Runnalls, (1998).  “Shall we dance?”  International Institute for Sustainable Development
(IISD), Trade and Sustainable Development Research Guide,
http://iisd1.iisd.ca/trade/dance.htm
Schmenner, R. (1982). Making Business Location Decisions.  Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs,
NJ.
Smith, K. and J.A. Espinosa (1996). "Environmental and trade policies:  Some methodological
lessons"  Environment and Development Economics:  19-40.
Sprenger, R.U. (1992). Umweltschutz als Standortfaktor. Friedrich Erbert Stiftung: Bonn.
Sprenger, R.U. (1997). "Globalization, employment and environment" Globalization and
Environment, OECD Proceedings, OECD: Paris.
Stafford, H.A. (1985).  "Environmental protection and industrial location," Annals of the
Association of American Geographers, 75(2):227-240.
Strutt, A. and K. Anderson, (1998). "Will trade liberalization harm the environment?  The case
of Indonesia to 2020."  Seminar Paper 98-04 Center for International Economic Studies,
University of Adelaide, May.48
Subramanian, A. (1992). "Trade measures for environment:  A nearly empty box?"  The World
Economy, January, 15(1).
United Nations (1996).  World Economic and Social Survey,  UN: New York.
von Moltke, K. (1996). "International environmental management, trade regimes and
sustainability."  Paper prepared for the International Institute for Sustainable Development
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, January.
Walter, I. (1973). "The pollution content of American trade," Western Economic Journal, 11:61-
70.
Wheeler, D. and A. Mody (1992).  "International investment location decisions:  The case of US
firms," Journal of International Economics, 33: 57-76.
Wintner L. (1982). Urban Plant Siting, Conference Board: New York.
World Bank (1997). Can the environment wait? Priorities for East Asia.
World Resources Institute (1990).  World Resources 1990-91, Oxford University Press: New
York.
World Resources Institute (1996).  World Resources: A Guide to the Global Environment. WRI:
Washington, DC.
World Trade Organization (1995).  International Trade Trends and Statistics, WTO: Geneva.
World Trade Organization (1996). Trade and Foreign Direct Investment. WTO: Geneva.
Young, J.E. and A. Sachs (1995).  "Creating a sustainable materials economy," in L. Brown et al,
(eds.) State of the World 1995.  Earthscan: London.
Zarsky, L. (1991).  Trade-Environment Linkages and Ecologically Sustainable Development,
Report to Department of Arts, Sports, Environment, Tourism and Territories, Environmental
Strategy Branch, Australia, October.
Zarsky, L. (1997). "Stuck in the mud?  Nation-states, globalization, and environment."
Globalization and Environment, OECD Proceedings, OECD: Paris.